Mea culpa: I do know tweeting an distinctive (however solely undocumented!) annual return determine on Jan-1st is now de rigueur for FinTwit, however I’ll keep on with my typical method, so apologies once more for being a bit late with my 2024 annual evaluate. However hey, hopefully a few of you had been nonetheless anticipating it…and this removed from the madding crowd, it now proves a extra leisurely (& helpful) learn! And whereas we’re at it, I ought to in fact apologise for nonetheless being on WordPress, not Substack. For nonetheless plugging away doing this 13+ years later. For nonetheless having no paywall/€XXX annual subscription (I imply, what’s his bloody recreation?!). For nonetheless disclosing precise portfolio modifications, primarily on a real-time foundation, and offering a completely documented/auditable efficiency monitor file & place sizes – yup, NO look-back buys/sells, after-hours trades, and/or undisclosed hedges right here! – one of many only a few, if not the one (free) funding weblog left on the planet (nonetheless) doing this. Whoops…and for nonetheless calling it an funding weblog, for God’s sake!? And most of all, for nonetheless having no blue checkmark on X…
I do know, perhaps I ought to be serious about altering all that…in spite of everything, it’s human nature for folks to worth what they really pay for, versus what they get without cost, whatever the precise high quality, amount, and/or worth concerned. And consistently being demoted by the X algorithm (duhhh, no checkmark & helpful third-party hyperlinks in most of my tweets!) is not any enjoyable both. Then again, I don’t want the cash, and I don’t fancy a brand new ‘boss’. And name me old school, or simply plain previous tough, however I like having real skin-in-the-game with a inventory, its administration & fellow buyers – it’s the final word alignment with readers & followers who really analysis & purchase the identical shares I personal – and the unavoidable actuality with any paywall/subscription is that you simply rapidly exhaust your main portfolio holdings & find yourself recommending shares through which you’re barely invested, or don’t even personal in any respect! I suppose embracing that path (& its rewards) is the secret, and arguably it’s completely fantastic if your clients obtain truthful warning…however for me, the ‘compensation’ I worth from the weblog is realizing fellow buyers have (ideally) multi-bagged with me, and at worst really feel the identical ache & hopefully lose much less cash than I do on some (inevitable) losers.
[To be fair: In my first (Wexboy) decade, my win ratio was actually 70%, which I concluded was (perversely) too high…ie I needed to re-train my attitude to risk & force myself to start adding more smaller/riskier holdings, which would presumably decrease my win ratio, but also (I suspect) increase my long-term returns overall.]
However time to crack on right here – my FY-2024 Benchmark Return continues to be a easy common of the 4 foremost indices that greatest characterize my portfolio, and it produced a benchmark +11.6% achieve:
These returns are so predictable now, it’s develop into extra & extra absurd at this level…the S&P 500 wildly outperformed its long-term common returns once more (& delivered the same old 3/4x return of the FTSE 100 & STOXX Euro 600), and regardless of the particular underlying causes*, mathematically this clearly can’t proceed indefinitely. [*Duhhh, it’s the Magnificent 7…which saw the Nasdaq close up +28.6% last year]. Whereas the ISEQ carried out someplace in between these two extremes, a return to type after an unexpectedly S&P-like efficiency in 2023. Traders clearly stay typically suspicious of smaller firms, with the FTSE 250 up +4.7%, whereas the Russell 2000 closed up +10.0% (respectable, however a fraction of the S&P/Nasdaq). [It was another down year for the AIM All-Share, at (5.7)%, making the consistently positive returns of so many AIM/small-cap portfolios on UK FinTwit even more tiresome]. Elsewhere, returns weren’t a lot completely different for the MSCI Rising Markets USD Index (up +5.1%) & the MSCI Frontier Markets USD Index (up +9.5%), however crypto once more delivered spectacular returns with Bitcoin up +121% & Ethereum up +46%.
This yr I’ll resist the urge to opine extra concerning the markets: We’re solely in the beginning of one other Trump presidency, US nationwide debt’s beginning to spiral uncontrolled (even when DOGE succeeds, received’t the ‘financial savings’ be spent on tax cuts anyway?), we’re more likely to see a wave of anti-incumbent/elite populist actions & governments for years to come back within the West (each left & proper), I believe we’re in all probability nowhere near completed with an distinctive AI-driven bubble market (which drags expertise & crypto greater too)…and in spite of everything, no person actually is aware of something!? So it’s each man for himself – there’s loads of danger on the market, but in addition loads of alternative to come back – your portfolio & investing fashion will more and more depend upon what you even have the abdomen to consider in & what you might have the persistence to sleep comfortably with every night time.
So let’s rip the bandage off right here – right here’s my precise Wexboy FY-2024 Portfolio Efficiency, by way of particular person winners & losers:
[Gains are based on average stake size (NB: NO actual changes in holdings, except for an imperceptible increase in TFG due to its DRIP) & end-2024 vs. end-2023 share prices. All dividends & FX gains/losses are excluded.]
And ranked by measurement of particular person portfolio holdings:
And once more, merging the 2 collectively – by way of particular person portfolio return:
I’m clearly none too happy with a (9.6)% loss for the yr…it’s not disastrous in absolute phrases, however it’s clearly an enormous under-performance relative to my precise benchmark. To not point out, a fraction of the returns generated by each random FinTwit über-portfolio on the market (in fact)!
KR1 is clearly in charge right here (& File doesn’t assist). If I’d restricted myself to the sub-3%/5% KR1 holding I constantly advocate to different buyers, my total return would have been moderately constructive, and if it was absent from my portfolio I’d have broadly matched my benchmark return final yr. However I didn’t, and it wasn’t – which affords some delectable schadenfreude to the same old suspects – you’re welcome!
However this additionally illustrates why the whingers & haters accomplish that badly in the long run…they simply don’t have the imaginative and prescient, or the abdomen, or the persistence, or the angle, to truly discover them (early) & then really dangle on to the real/long-term compounders. And naturally they received’t bear in mind (or received’t admit) that within the prior yr, KR1’s NAV/share was really up +178%, the share worth itself was up +268%, it was a serious driver of an total +65.4% achieve in my portfolio, and it’s an uncomfortably massive place in the present day just because it’s turned out to be such an enormous multi-bagger for me during the last 7+ years! Clearly, this can be a high-quality downside to have…
However longer-term readers & followers already see/know this – I’ve written tons of of 1000’s of phrases through the years on this weblog about investing & particular investments, and lately it actually simply boils all the way down to: i) winners hold successful – the problem isn’t discovering them, it’s really holding on to the top quality compounders by means of thick & skinny to compound your wealth, and ii) diversifying your portfolio as a lot as doable – and I see NO actual proof of that in 95% of the portfolios I encounter on X & the web – to additionally assist defend your wealth. And sarcastically I realise that the much less I write now on the weblog, the much less I chop & change positions, the much less I add new write-ups, the higher I illustrate & drive residence that ‘maintain & diversify’ lesson. And once more, by way of outcomes, the +26.0% pa returns from my first decade right here (once more, absolutely documented alongside the best way!) are an awesome endorsement…and whereas my 15 yr returns clearly stay a work-in-progress, I’m very proud of my long-term (non-public) returns, which in fact are a key purpose the weblog really exists & my former/now forgotten profession not does! So, yeah:
Maintain…and diversify!
And with that, let’s do an annual evaluate of my present (disclosed) holdings:
i) Donegal Funding Group ($DQ7A.IR)
FY-2024 +0.6% Acquire. Yr-Finish 0.7% Portfolio Holding.
[NB: Year-end holding reflects (0.1)% impact of the latest return of capital (approved in Nov-24 & settled end Jan-25).]
Deal, or no deal?! Effectively, nonetheless no (last) deal…however not less than Donegal Funding Group introduced one other return of capital earlier than year-end. This displays a continued build-up of web money to €9.7 million (inc. a bond funding maturity), as of November – sadly, solely half the money was really utilised, ie €4.8M to redeem 18.15% of all shareholdings at €16.50/share (100% for holdings of fifty shares or much less), which given the information appears far too conservative right here. Nevertheless it’s now retired one other 19.1% of Donegal’s o/s shares, lowering the online share rely to 1.23M shares.
We additionally noticed a welcome +11% improve in seed potato gross sales (to €33 million) for FY-2024, albeit income does oscillate relying on annual yields/pricing. Underlying working margin was unchanged at 5.0%+, however the division can ship 7-10% margins in its greatest years, plus it absolutely absorbs Donegal’s central (board/itemizing/and so forth.) prices, so I nonetheless see a 1.0 to 2.0 P/S deal a number of vary as truthful, specifically accounting for its mental property portfolio, its (absolutely expensed) R&D spending/pipeline & further value/income synergies within the palms of a bigger acquirer. [The Nomadic Dairy sale achieved a 1.8 P/S multiple, for comparable reasons]. Minority buyers also needs to be reassured by the administrators’ 6.5% stake & Pageant Investments/Nick Furlong’s 12.7% stake in Donegal, which ought to finally incentivise & ship a compelling deal.
Submit-capital return, Donegal holds €4.9 million in web money, €0.6M in funding property & a €0.7M/20% funding in Uktal Seeds (India), versus a €20.3M market cap (at €16.50/share), so buyers are presently valuing the seed potato enterprise on a 0.4 P/S a number of!? Which leaves loads of low-risk/event-driven upside on supply right here…alas, it’s 3+ years now for the reason that Nomadic sale & we nonetheless don’t have any public affirmation of a last seed potato sale course of (or of Donegal itself), however in the meantime the corporate pays its manner with a 1.8M pa web revenue, so my foremost frustration right here is definitely the near-zero buying and selling quantity & my lack of ability to re-up my place.
FY-2024 (5.3)% Loss. Yr-Finish 0.8% Portfolio Holding.
One other (small) holding simply marking time right here…although a +7.4% yield made for an total achieve final yr. [Yield’s higher again today at +8.0%, per the higher/proposed dividend]. The corporate did appoint a brand new CFO (internally), however in any other case it’s mainly enterprise as typical. Annual pelt volumes normalised again to 10.5 million in FY-2024, however a +20% improve in costs delivered a mere (3)% decline in complete brokerage gross sales to €343M. Sadly, a decrease take charge & unexpectedly low financing earnings meant earnings per share almost halved to €0.73/share. Nevertheless, that is attributable to a poor H1, with pelt volumes down sharply by (35)% in the important thing March public sale, so H2 eps of €0.68/share appears way more indicative of Saga’s present run-rate, and is supported by a restructuring which eradicated expense within the defunct Dutch & Danish markets, plus some further native personnel/rental expense. [Justified as a response to lower volumes, but could/should be a nice tailwind as scheduled FY-25 volumes (at 10.0M) are in line with the medium-term average of 10M+ pelts, and financing income ideally picks up again]. Administration definitely appears to be indicating this with a 97% payout ratio (ie a proposed €0.71/share dividend).
That H2 annualised run-rate is €1.36/share, not far off the common €1.51 eps we noticed within the final 4 years (vs. a ten.7 million pelt common), which pegs Saga Furs on a 6.5 P/E, vs. a €8.90 market worth in the present day. Alas, there’s little signal buyers will award the next a number of, within the absence of any form of sustained progress trajectory. That being mentioned, you accumulate a +8% yield, and worth buyers on X & the message boards are likely to rediscover Saga each two/three years & bid it as much as €12.00+ & even €17.00+ worth ranges, not less than briefly. And there’s nonetheless the potential for Chinese language acquirer (alas, a Russian bidder’s off the desk), however who is aware of the timing/IRR of such an end result. Satirically, one of the best end result right here can be an precise (phased) shutdown of the fur business in Finland/Europe…in that situation, I’m fairly assured a Saga Furs wind-down would ship its present €25+ NAV per share, so how about one final ESG win?!
iii) Tetragon Monetary Group ($TFG.AS)
FY-2024 +42% Acquire. Yr-Finish 3.5% Portfolio Holding.
[NB: Year-end holding reflects a new (pre-yearend) 1.0% increase in my position, as I confirmed Jan-1st on X.]
2024 was (lastly) an actual inflection/breakout yr for Tetragon Monetary Group, with buyers having fun with a +42% share worth achieve (& a +4.5% yield). This displays a +15.4% NAV/share complete return – its greatest in years, once more reinforcing its longer-term file of low-volatility 9-10%+ pa web returns – and a narrowing of Tetragon’s NAV low cost from 68% to a nonetheless astonishing 60%. [Worth highlighting: Even with zero NAV gains/dividends, that relatively small discount compression would have still delivered a +25% shareholder gain!] Crucially, it additionally helps silence the haters – who had been all the time joyful to trot out their typical misconceptions, lies & historic historical past right here – additional bettering sentiment, with the refill an extra +10% YTD & hitting new all-time-highs). And I’d count on additional positive aspects forward, based mostly on anticipated developments this yr with some key investments…to not point out a recent wave of shopping for IF the shares finally commerce $19/$20+ a share (per my typical rule – most punters solely get after a share doubles!).
There have been three foremost NAV drivers final yr: The primary was Hawke’s Level, which funds top quality mining initiatives within the Australian (& North American) useful resource sector – its worth grew virtually +70%/+$80 million final yr, net-net, albeit masking vital (draw back) volatility alongside the best way from a peak $320M worth as of end-October. [One can hardly complain about the overall net gain!] The second is Ripple Labs A&B Most well-liked Inventory, which gained an astonishing 130%+/$135M+, within the final two months of the yr, reflecting its SEC win earlier within the yr, the election of Trump & a brand new crypto-friendly administration in November, and a subsequent 4/seven-fold achieve in $XRP’s market worth. Third, we noticed a +25%/+$185M achieve in Tetragon’s 75%+ stake in Equitix, acquired the welcome information in October of an precise sale course of (nonetheless ongoing in the present day), and affirmation TFG’s stake had elevated to 81.5% however would now accrue a tail/earnings legal responsibility to former Equitix administration (for the second, I’m assuming it nonetheless nets again out to an efficient 75% stake). All instructed, much less dividends & a measly $25M tender supply – that’s lower than 1% of NAV & barely 40%+ of the tender affords in 2023 – these positive aspects in worth web out to a near-$350M NAV improve final yr.
This yr, hopefully we see an precise sale of Equitix – a £1.5 billion price ticket has been floated, vs. $14B+ of AUM, reflecting different current offers & a voracious urge for food for various/infrastructure asset managers. That worth could also be a bit wealthy, however I’d count on an precise deal to nonetheless supply vital upside for Tetragon’s 75%+ stake, vs. a year-end $922 million worth. [Which would again confirm the (prudent) valuations assigned to TFG Asset Management, which is currently valued at $1.6B vs. $41.2B in AUM (up 50% from $27.4B at end-2019)]. And such a deal might clearly equate to 80%+ of Tetragon’s present market cap – and web debt’s nonetheless beneath 10% of gross belongings, so there’s no urgent must repay any of it – in order that’s the place the rubber actually meets the street:
Both Griffith & Expensive flex their management muscular tissues, try to reinvest the money & personally accumulate the charges on the administration contract for an additional 5/10 years, OR they really deal with enhancing/realising shareholder worth through a massively accretive tender supply for an enormous % of Tetragon’s o/s shares. The previous was buyers’ default assumption up to now (& rightly so), however because the principals age out (& need to doubtlessly revalue/realise their very own stake), and TFG’s different administration/workers foyer re their steadily rising stake, and noting the sheer scale of this potential deal, the chances shift in favour of the latter…clearly it’s nonetheless a wholly event-driven situation, however IF we see a sale & IF we see an enormous tender supply, then we’ll additionally see a step-change in sentiment & the NAV low cost. Additional, let’s hope we are able to additionally add some crypto pixie-dust to the equation – again of the envelope, Tetragon now owns someplace between 2.25%-2.5% of Ripple Labs, whose non-public market (fairness) worth is presently value one thing like $14/$15.5 billion in the present day, vs. its precise treasury of 43.3B+ $XRP, which is presently value one thing like $107B! That’s a hell of a price hole, one that would doubtlessly be closed/realised through what I’d name an anti-$MSTR technique, ie (progressively) promoting $XRP crypto & shopping for Ripple fairness.
And Ripple Labs has already began down this street – executing two/three tender affords within the final yr, funded from $XRP gross sales – a method that would entice much more consideration & be additional refined IF Ripple & Brad Garlinghouse really suggest an IPO, now that Trump’s within the White Home. So yeah, it’s undoubtedly a good suggestion right here to do the maths & work out the potential/uneven upside for Tetragon on its Ripple Labs stake…vs. its present $1.3B market cap (& a possible/impending sale of Equitix).
iv) VinaCapital Vietnam Alternative Fund ($VOF.L)
FY-2024 +2.6% Acquire. Yr-Finish 4.8% Portfolio Holding.
The VinaCapital Vietnam Alternative Fund efficiency in 2024 – really an total 5%+ achieve, together with a +2.5% yield – seems to be very very similar to 2023, however once more this obscures a a lot more healthy Vietnamese market. The VN Index was really up one other 12%+, however this was mitigated by the dong depreciation we’ve seen during the last three years & which accelerated to (5.1)% in 2024 – not stunning, given the greenback power we noticed elsewhere in Asia (& globally). By way of VOF’s London itemizing, a slightly weaker sterling helped, however shareholder returns had been additional harm by a widening of the NAV low cost from 18% to 23%+.
This displays: i) the pervasive London valuation low cost, which is commonly justified (domestically) however presents an unimaginable alternative to purchase into worldwide publicity/firms on a budget, and ii) continued investor aversion to any form of frontier/rising markets funding. The latter is especially irritating as Vietnam’s on the FTSE Russell watchlist to be promoted from Frontier to Rising Market standing, which might immediate vital inflows (whatever the common investor apathy). It additionally belies the VOF workforce’s wonderful in-house IR perform, which offers common/detailed communication with shareholders, periodic buyers shows & roadshows, a steady share buyback programme, and ensured a seamless portfolio administration transition after the premature demise of Andy Ho (VinaCapital’s CIO) final June.
Evidently, the quick & long-term outlook are nonetheless as promising as ever. Vietnam is the new China – it has a younger & comparatively well-educated workforce which under-cuts China’s labour prices & may also transfer up the export curve, it’s already a major marketplace for China outsourcing, it has a robust buying and selling relationship with the US, its GDP progress has accelerated to 7%+ whereas inflation’s regular round 3%, and regardless of some current political in-fighting & musical chairs it does a much better/extra relaxed job than China of balancing a capitalist financial system vs. one occasion communist management. Then again, Trump’s tariff bazooka might current a brand new menace, however arguably political/tariff tensions with China will proceed to assist Vietnam as a substitute export market & a de facto China-US entrepôt. As for the market itself, it now trades on a ten.3 ahead P/E, vs. 13-15%+ earnings progress (in 2024 & 2025), with the VNI buying and selling simply shy resistance at 1,290-1,310 (for nearly three years now) & doubtlessly all set for a serious rally & new 1,500+ all-time-highs if this resistance stage can lastly be damaged. Comparable resistance & ATHs lie forward for VOF, and in the meantime its portfolio mixture of public fairness, PIPE, OTC/pre-IPO shares & actual property investments provides vital & distinctive diversification versus its peer funds.
FY-2024 (25)% Loss. Yr-Finish 5.1% Portfolio Holding.
[NB: After a YTD (12)% share price decline, I subsequently increased my position by +0.9% from 4.5% (at the time) to a 5.4% holding, as I confirmed Jan-18th on X. #REC’s rallied +17% since.]
File managed to comply with up a (22)% loss in 2023 with a (25)% share worth loss in 2024…this was mitigated by a +7.3% yield, however nonetheless calls for the apparent query: How was I so mistaken about one in all my largest holdings? Effectively, as a substitute, I purchased extra #REC in January! Which looks as if a direct violation of my typical mantra to ‘common up, not down!’…in all probability the toughest lesson any investor can hope to be taught & grasp.
Nevertheless it highlights an vital nuance right here – the main target is all the time on the enterprise, not the share worth – ie your greatest long-term compounders (inevitably) come from averaging up & into the rising KPIs/constructive enterprise trajectory of an awesome enterprise (typically mirrored in a rising share worth/valuation), not averaging down on a declining enterprise (even at an ever cheaper worth/valuation). And likewise highlights the disconnect between short-term buyers who obsess over the share worth, the newest outcomes (vs. dealer consensus!?) & are simply suckered into the same old ‘worth drives narrative’ spiral, versus buyers who ignore the noise & deal with the long-term (absolute) progress trajectory of a enterprise. In File’s case, income’s up 75%+ & earnings per share greater than doubled within the final 3.5 years, whereas AUM’s close to an all-time-high at $100.5 billion…that’s what I’m really averaging up on right here.
Hassle is, in FY-24 & H1-25, File has been: i) consolidating the aggressive AUM, income & earnings progress of the prior two years, ii) investing in greater wages & extra workers, an IT in-house restructuring/redevelopment, and new merchandise, enterprise traces & AUM (inc. a brand new €1.1 billion+ infrastructure fairness fund launch from its new 41%-owned RAM sub.) to diversify & assist its medium-term progress technique*, and iii) managing the transition to an entire new technology of administration, specifically responding to the long-anticipated retirements of Leslie Hill & Steve Cullen with the appointment (internally) of Jan Witte as CEO & Richard Heading (ex-Group FD of IG Group) as CFO. This left eps flat/down marginally during the last yr & a half, with the share worth spiraling decrease in response, compounded by a savage & relentless bear market in an in any other case unrelated UK-listed asset administration sector (with most share costs hitting new 5/10 yr lows in the previous few months).
[*And yes, Witte & Heading clearly need to refine & reiterate this strategy at the next FY results. Exploring the idea of adding more external talent/partnerships like RAM would be very welcome too – recruiting a couple of the City’s top cold callers & deal closers would inject some killer instinct into the culture, and some external partnerships (for example, in Asia) would help tap what is a relatively unlimited potential TAM for Record’s FX business].
However isn’t that how markets work…earnings pause = degrowth = derating?! Yeah however, what’s the appropriate a number of if File delivered +23% pa eps progress during the last 3.5 years? A 25+ P/E may work, proper? However that’s what File really delivered…besides it was +46% pa eps progress over two years, then (2)% pa over 1.5 years! And therefore, REC trades on a sub-10 P/E in the present day (vs. H1 annnualised eps of 5.62p), and buyers even query whether or not its present +9.5% yield is sustainable. [Yes, it is…noting 7.4p/share of surplus net cash & how sticky Record’s business actually is!]. Whereas I stay assured, as do former owner-operators Neil File & Leslie Hill (who nonetheless personal a 36%+ stake, in mixture), of File’s precise intrinsic worth (and/or potential deal worth!?) & its longer-term progress technique – I absolutely count on the £60 million income & 40% working margin targets that Hill initially set shall be attained sooner or later, presuming continued AUM progress/diversification, good execution & substantial working leverage, and can ship 10p+ earnings per share accordingly. With REC buying and selling 52p+/share once more, breaking crucial 58p assist/resistance stage would sign a return to its current 62-70p worth vary…in the meantime, buyers should purchase a top quality recurring enterprise on a 2.0 EV/Income a number of, versus a 31% working margin, a 42% incremental working revenue margin over the previous few years & finally a possible 65%+ incremental working margin.
FY-2024 +36% Acquire. Yr-Finish 13.9% Portfolio Holding.
And what a juggernaut Alphabet is…it took 15 years to succeed in $100 billion in income, and solely one other 6 years to succeed in $300B! In FY-2024, income was up one other +14% to surpass $350B (with YouTube & Cloud now on a $110B run-rate), working revenue was up +31% as working margins continued increasing to 32%, and earnings per share was additionally up +31%. Which mirrors what we’ve seen during the last 5 years, with income greater than doubling & working revenue/eps compounding at 27% pa. Which highlights how (absurdly) low cost the corporate nonetheless is right here, buying and selling on a 20.5 ahead P/E. Which, for a lot the identical causes as I initially detailed, would indicate a P/E within the teenagers for the precise core enterprise…so $GOOGL’s multi-bagged since I first wrote it up in 2017 (‘So Why Not Google It..?’), however continues to be mainly simply as low cost in the present day!
Yeah however, the haters refrain – what if Alphabet loses the AI Wars? And isn’t Search going to zero anyway…if Bing didn’t kill it off already?! And all the opposite questions they requested 5 years in the past & 5 years therefore, despite the fact that they could by no means really step up & purchase $GOOGL – why even argue with them, when each set of outcomes are the one rebuttal wanted.
However all that doubt & nervousness highlights a basic misunderstanding of the dangers & alternatives. Zooming in on Search, it’s crucial to understand its core monetization drivers are literally a slightly restricted (however extremely worthwhile) sub-set of the complete universe of search queries – ie it’s primarily customers researching & really/doubtlessly shopping for merchandise & providers, and Search stays probably the most environment friendly manner to try this. And that’s why Google now fortunately offers an AI Overview for many queries – it enhances the person expertise & doesn’t disrupt the underlying enterprise mannequin, since most queries aren’t essentially monetizable anyway. That being mentioned, we’re on the verge of agentic AI, so Search economics will migrate into that person expertise too, and/or develop into an precise recurring income subscription mannequin through a private digital assistant.
As for the massive image, it’s value highlighting Google/Alphabet was/is the world’s greatest & greatest AI firm (go on, attempt clarify your life & the world pre-Google Search to your children!?). And Open AI was constructed on Google’s Transformer mannequin/structure. And Anthropic successfully spun out of Open AI. And DeepSeek clearly leveraged off Open AI/ChatGPT. And fashions/groups will clearly proceed to bootstrap/leverage off pre-existing information/fashions/groups on the street to AGI & ASI – in spite of everything, that’s how human intelligence works too. And it’s now turning into way more apparent that AI is inevitably open-source, and can develop into extra & extra pervasive in our lives through the cloud & (smartphone) edge computing.
Digesting all that, and weighing it up versus what DeepSeek’s simply achieved (to not point out Chinese language GPUs!?), the precise winners & trajectory of the {hardware} arms race are nonetheless not completely apparent to me…however alternatively, Jevons Paradox in all probability does kick in, ie the cheaper/higher/quicker AI will get, the extra we use, the extra underlying {hardware}/infrastructure we’ll inevitably want whatever the precise quantum of required value/effectivity/and so forth. Subsequently: i) to purchase (& really hold holding!) the likes of Nvidia, and so forth. might effectively show difficult alongside the best way, so timing & entry worth shall be critically vital, but in addition ii) Alphabet committing to $75B in capex spending for 2025 is totally the right technique – by way of its cashflow (& money pile), it’s clearly an reasonably priced guess, whereas not making the funding might show an existential menace.
However I’m extremely assured the final word beneficiaries of AI are the businesses who can really plug it in & monetize it seamlessly in all facets of our every day lives, our smartphones (& smart-glasses), our laptops, our autonomous autos. And naturally Alphabet’s already THE apparent/successful candidate – and sure, Apple one other candidate, as are Alibaba & Tencent behind the Chinese language firewall – because it presently boasts seven completely different merchandise/platforms with 2 BILLION+ USERS EACH (all of whom can already entry/use Gemini). Which in my e-book makes $GOOGL the largest & greatest AI guess you may make right here…and in addition an apparent potential hedge for the remainder of your portfolio, your work-life & your loved ones.
FY-2024 (30)% Loss. Yr-Finish 15.8% Portfolio Holding.
KR1 was an enormous disappointment in 2024, and watching Bitcoin rally 120%+ & hit new $108K+ all-time-highs alongside the best way, whereas KR1 really fell (30)%, was clearly painful for a lot of shareholders. [Again, I should obviously highlight this follows a +268% gain for KR1 & massive out-performance vs. $BTC/$ETH in 2023]. Alas, this divergence was not solely surprising, and undoubtedly not the primary time we’ve seen this explicit film…once more, I’d sum it up as:
$BTC ==> $ETH ==> #alts ==> #KR1
The funding & the positive aspects come first in Bitcoin (whereas $BTC maximalists triumphantly declare $ETH/#alts/and so forth. are all going to ZERO!), then unfold out/rollover into (bigger) positive aspects in Ethereum, then spill over into (even bigger) positive aspects in #alts, and at last ship (doubtlessly exponential) positive aspects for KR1. [Rem, my last major KR1 write-up caught this inflection point perfectly back in late-2020, with the KR1 share price doing a 15x & the valuation multiple expanding from sub-0.8 P/B to a 2.5+ P/B in just three months!] And no, I don’t suppose it’s completely different this time…certain, the regulatory acceptance & institutionalization of Bitcoin final yr could have delayed the same old roll-over into Ethereum (‘solely’ up +46% final yr), however I’m hopeful this new/secular crypto allocation course of (into investor portfolios) will mitigate/eradicate the same old crypto summer time/winter cycle(s) up to now.
So sure, I’m assured the true positive aspects for $ETH, #alts & KR1 are doubtlessly nonetheless forward. And I believe $BTC maxis ought to be lauded & mocked right here…ie they mainly persuaded the world that blockchain is an extremely worthwhile expertise, however nonetheless need the world to consider such a foundational expertise ought to/shall be restricted to a single ‘utility’ developed/launched 16 years in the past!? Which appears fairly foolish to me…so let me repeat my thesis:
‘Bitcoin’s finally a guess on worth…blockchain’s a guess on innovation!‘
And that’s what KR1 is – from day one, it’s eschewed Bitcoin & proof-of work, focusing as a substitute on investing in early stage crypto/blockchain initiatives (which in flip, primarily deal with constructing out the complete/inter-connected infrastructure of the crypto universe) & on producing proof-of-stake earnings. And recognising it’s nonetheless a brand new expertise (& asset class), the KR1 workforce constructed the corporate to outlive any form of volatility – as a result of crypto beta is unavoidable – so that they centered on diversification, and prevented all the same old debt, dilution & catastrophe different crypto-stocks have been so lethal at delivering for his or her shareholders. I name it the ZERO funding thesis…KR1 boasts ZERO {hardware}, power use, debt, dilution, taxes & capital required!
During the last 8.5 years, this endurance & the distinctive alpha of KR1’s diversified early-stage portfolio has really delivered the best-in-class crypto-stock funding monitor file on the planet…ie a +75% pa/11,125%+ return in each KR1’s NAV/share & share worth. No different crypto-stock (or stonk) comes shut. And no different crypto-stock generates any form of recurring revenue, not to mention free money move…whereas KR1’s really generated a median £14 million pa in staking earnings during the last three years, together with £13.0M in FY-2024 (& an £11.4M run-rate in December) vs. a present £86M/$107M market cap!). And observe there’s an precise 95% NET margin on that staking earnings…and I don’t imply the bullshit margin nonsense crypto-miners (for instance) present, I actually imply a 95% revenue margin with zero {hardware}/power prices, zero incremental G&A, zero curiosity prices, zero taxes & zero capital required.
That being mentioned, KR1 is not a widows & orphans inventory…it’s nonetheless primarily quoted on Aquis (albeit, it’s an RIE similar to the LSE), spreads may be vast, it might probably require persistence to construct (& exit) a place, and it might even require a full-service dealer commerce! Which is seemingly such a tall order, you possibly can nonetheless purchase KR1 on just about the most affordable crypto-stock a number of (a 0.82 P/B as of year-end, a lot the identical as end-2023 (a 0.84 P/B) & again in Jul-2016 (a 0.85 P/B), with the share worth/NAV notably decrease once more YTD), regardless of it boasting one of the best +75% pa monitor file on the earth! And many KR1 punters will complain & moan the workforce might/ought to do a greater job…which is clearly grossly unfair, noting their spectacular monitor file. I’d put it extra diplomatically…there’s an excessive amount of cash (inc. the workforce’s, since they now personal ~25% of KR1, so that they have loads of skin-in-the-game/alignment with fellow shareholders) being left on the desk right here, if you examine KR1 to the (a lot greater) multiples & cash flowing to different/vastly inferior crypto-stocks, and plenty of icing to be added to the cake (so as of precedence):
i) Add knowledgeable in-house IR/PR perform & guarantee additionally they have some skin-in-the-game – there’s a military of potential buyers on the market who nonetheless do not know KR1 exists, and/or want a great IR story to even think about researching/shopping for the inventory.
ii) Up-list/dual-list KR1 from Aquis to the London Inventory Change – once more, that pulls a brand new military of potential buyers – if David Lenigas can up-list his newest promotional crypto-stock (Vinanz) to the LSE in a matter of weeks, then the FCA, LSE & KR1 workforce have little excuse to not do the identical.
iii) Re-activate KR1’s share buyback authority, coupled with knowledgeable IR/PR marketing campaign, to soak up staking earnings, improve NAV/share, enhance investor sentiment & broaden KR1’s valuation a number of.
iv) Re-accelerate the tempo of funding – the workforce invested in three new initiatives in 2024 (Tanssi, Mode & Avail), which stack up/construct on its present unlisted portfolio, since there’s typically a 2-3 yr journey to main-net as of late – however that present pipeline will must be topped up/re-filled sooner or later.
Once more, I believe it’s now prudent & smart for all buyers to think about a 3-5% crypto allocation of their portfolio, and I’d advocate a long-term KR1 holding as a diversified portfolio/best-in-class funding monitor file that may fulfill some/all of that allocation. [If preferred, along with some $BTC ETF exposure…I do not recommend leveraged $BTC ETFs or vehicles (like $MSTR or the crypto-miners), or any promotional crypto-stonks with no track record of creating any real intrinsic value]. And for fellow buyers, I’m additionally alerting you to the just-released information of Redstone Finance’s upcoming main-net – KR1 invested in its 2021 & 2022 pre-seed/seed rounds, and my default assumption is that they find yourself with ~1% (ie someplace between 0.8% & 1.2%) of the challenge/1.0 billion $RED provide – KR1’s $0.4 million funding in Redstone up to now is immaterial vs. its present NAV, however as we’ve seen earlier than (with Celestia, for instance) the potential worth of its upcoming $RED allocation might show very materials to KR1’s present £86M/$107M market cap!?
Okay, that’s it – when you have any questions, please simply ask.
And better of luck in 2025..!
